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Abstract 
Participants in a supply chain of agricultural value-added products face significant 
challenges. Many of the costly distinctive traits desired by consumers are difficult (if not 
impossible) to observe even after consumption. A complicating factor, addressed here, is 
that in some circumstances delivered quality can only be imperfectly learned and/or 
affected stochastically by producers. Hence, both symmetric and asymmetric 
informational imperfections may be present. In order for markets for these classes of 
goods to arise, firms touting the quality of the product need to be trusted. A repeated-
purchases model is developed to explore the fundamental economic factors that lie 
behind the choice of different quality assurance systems and their associated degrees of 
stringency by firms. Differences in the quality discoverability of a sought-after attribute, 
attractiveness of a market, and the value placed in the future are among the factors 
contributing to the implementation of widely diverse systems across participants in 
different markets. Close attention is paid to the role of reputations in providing the 
incentives for firms to deliver high-quality goods in an environment of symmetrically 
imperfect information.  
 
Keywords: imperfect information, product quality, quality assurance, repeated 
purchases, reputations, supply chain, value-added agriculture. 
 
  
REPUTATION, QUALITY OBSERVABILITY, AND THE CHOICE OF  
QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS 
The keys to success in commodity agricultural production are expansion to obtain 
scale economies, specialization, and adoption of cost-reducing technologies (Hennessy, 
Miranowski, and Babcock 2004). Producers and processors of commodities remain viable 
by following the prescribed strategy of producing and marketing their goods as inexpen-
sively as possible. The sustained race for cost reductions leads to an adoption spiral of 
increasingly investment-intensive, high-volume production technologies. Some entrepre-
neurs see an alternative path to profits by producing and marketing differentiated 
agricultural products. The feasibility of this path has increased with the growth in con-
sumer demand for specialty high-quality goods.1 Rising standards of living and 
increasing health and environmental awareness are frequently cited as forces driving the 
demand for a variety of higher-quality products and information about on-farm activities. 
The availability of new production technologies and information systems make it possi-
ble to supply the differentiated products that consumers are increasingly demanding.  
Participants in a supply chain of agricultural value-added products face significant 
challenges. Many of the costly distinctive traits desired by consumers are difficult (if not 
impossible) to observe even after consumption.2 Quality may be difficult to appraise, 
even for producers or processors. Hence, both symmetric and asymmetric informational 
imperfections may be present (see Antle 2001). In order for markets for these classes of 
goods to arise, firms touting the quality of the product need to be trusted. Hence, main-
taining an excellent reputation is essential for firm success. A complicating factor, 
addressed here, is that in some circumstances delivered quality can only be imperfectly 
learned and/or affected stochastically by producers. For example, even after using the 
best genetics available and following best management practices to obtain tender beef, it 
is possible that the resulting beef is not tender. Also, elevators cannot be absolutely cer-
tain that the grain they handle contains the claimed traits. The list of examples is long. 
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New quality assurance systems (QASs) are being put in place to facilitate the flow of 
information about agricultural and food products. Incentives for growers and food manu-
facturers to adopt QASs include (a) increased consumer demand for knowledge about 
where their food came from and how it was produced; (b) opportunities for producer 
groups to capture a greater share of the consumer dollar by differentiating their products; 
(c) greater protection for food manufacturers and retailers against food safety liability; 
and (d) increased chances that agreed upon specifications are met in a framework of im-
perfect information.  
Various QASs have been developed in the United States and elsewhere to facilitate 
the flow of information about products (Bredahl et al. 2001; Reardon and Farina 2001; 
Lawrence 2002; Carriquiry, Babcock, and Carbone 2003). In the United States, some 
have been developed purely by the private sector, while others have relied on the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to set standards. But what constitutes a proper mix of 
public and private efforts in setting up QASs is an unsettled question. A better under-
standing of private sector incentives for setting up such systems will help clarify what 
role the public sector might have in establishing and enforcing standards. We contribute 
to this understanding by modeling the optimal degree of “stringency” or assurance in a 
processor’s quality control system over procurement of agricultural output when uncer-
tainty about quality exists. More specifically, we study the role of reputational 
mechanisms in providing incentives to implement QASs. We compare the resulting de-
grees of stringency across different levels of consumer awareness or quality 
discoverability.  
The role of reputations as a deception-preventing device has been studied by Klein 
and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983), among others. These authors examine a situation 
in which the resulting quality is completely determined by a producer’s investments. The 
only study (we are aware of) that considers the case in which investments lead to higher 
expected quality (stochastically) in an environment of symmetrically imperfect informa-
tion is by Rob and Sekiguchi (2001), who consider the producer-consumer interface. In 
their study, consumers “discipline” firms by switching to rival firms when quality is be-
low certain tolerance levels and only one firm is able to make sales. We depart from that 
study by exploring the effects of different levels of quality discoverability on the choice 
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of investments in quality assurance by a single firm that we model as a monopolist. The 
focus of this paper is on an arbitrary link of a supply chain. 
Noelke and Caswell (2000) propose a model of quality management for credence at-
tributes in a supply chain. Based on a literature review, the authors discuss benefits and 
costs of a voluntary, quasi-voluntary, and mandatory quality management system (QMS) 
for a firm within a supply chain. They then provide some comparative static results on 
how the behavior of the firm (given by the choice of a QMS) changes when other firms 
upstream or downstream modify their QMS under different tort laws. In our model, the 
firm under consideration is the one that has influence on the behavior of firms upstream 
in the supply chain. We also make the probability that a firm is punished dependent on 
the ability of consumers to discern when quality is substandard. Hence, our model ac-
commodates credence, experience, and mixtures of the two types of goods. 
We include both process control, where verification of certain production methods 
are to be followed, and control over a physical attribute of the input. The model devel-
oped here predicts that the degree of stringency and the output rate depend on (a) whether 
the sought-after attribute is discoverable by consumers; (b) the price premium paid for 
the attribute; and (c) the punishment capabilities of downstream customers, which are 
related to the value firms place in the future. 
The next section provides an overview of the related literature, a detailed discussion 
of the situation studied, and the model presentation and analysis.  
 
Modeling Quality Assurance 
The two decisions modeled are the profit-maximizing rate of output and whether a 
buyer of an input should implement a QAS as a way to gain information about product 
quality that can be provided to its potential customers. If the buyer decides to implement 
a QAS, then the profit-maximizing level of assurance is determined.3 We study a particu-
lar case that is becoming pervasive in the food industry (Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker 
1998; Reardon and Farina 2001; Northen 2001; Fearne, Hornibrook, and Dedman 2001), 
in which an input buyer requires its suppliers to implement a given system of assurance. 
To do so, the buyer has to be an important player in the market (Reardon and Farina 
2001). This would be the case of a quasi-voluntary system (Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker 
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1998; Noelke and Caswell 2000). To keep the framework general, we are not specifying 
the “type” of quality assurance strategy that an input processor will follow. For example, 
assurance potentially can come from a system run by the buyer, from reliance on certifi-
cation by a private or public third party, or both. The information obtained through the 
implementation of the system allows the processing firm to better sort the input it buys, to 
gain a better idea of the actual quality of the inputs, and to be able to convey assurance to 
its customers about the quality of its product. The topic of this paper is especially relevant 
in an environment where it is difficult to assert the quality of a particular product (both 
before and after the input is processed and consumed). Clearly, if quality is readily ob-
servable by both input buyers and consumers, there is no need for a QAS in the 
procurement process.  
Quality characteristics of agricultural products have an inherently high degree of het-
erogeneity (Ligon 2002). This variability stems mainly from the randomness of the 
production environment (e.g., weather and biological uncertainty) and/or the heterogene-
ity of the practices employed by farmers. We aim to capture this variability, and the fact 
that quality can be only imperfectly assessed, by assuming that the processor believes it 
can be represented by a random vector Q . Specifically, let Q  denote the vector of the 
imperfectly observable array of quality attributes, and let _  denote the set of possible 
quality attributes of an input. In general, _  could be a set in many dimensions. However, 
for the sake of tractability, we will assume that only one quality attribute is of interest, is 
imperfectly observable, or differs across goods. In this case, the sample space of interest 
is one-dimensional (i.e., 1⊆ℜ_ ). Further, we assume that the unconditional cumulative 
distribution function of Q  is ( ) ( )PQ QF q Q q= ≤  for all q.4 This distribution of quality 
would prevail in the absence of a QAS or in the open market. 
We define quality as meeting an agreed-upon standard. Every unit of the product 
meeting or surpassing this minimum standard will be considered of high quality. Caswell, 
Noelke, and Mojduszka (2002, p. 58) also define quality in a supply chain as consistently 
delivering a product that meets or exceeds “defined sets of standards for extrinsic indica-
tors and cues.” The task of the processors is to decide which QAS to implement (if any) 
to better infer the nature of the product being certified. In particular, the QAS will inform 
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the processor about the proportion of the input that is likely to deliver a product that 
meets the minimum standard. Note, however, that the processor will not be able to dis-
cern the difference in quality of any given unit it actually buys. We assume that the 
quality of the processed output has a direct relationship to its input counterpart, an as-
sumption that is equivalent to claiming that the processing technology cannot be used as a 
substitute for input quality, or that it does so only at prohibitively high costs. We assume 
also that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the amount of input bought and 
output sold by a processor. Hence, the production technology works in a Leontief fash-
ion, and the decision on the output rate essentially determines how much of the 
agricultural input is needed.  
The proposed approach accommodates both the case in which the quality attribute or 
trait is the production method itself and the case in which the process alters the probabil-
ity distribution of quality (i.e., the costlier process increases the probability of obtaining a 
high-quality product). The former has an analog to a discrete attribute (the good was pro-
duced using a desired process or it was not), whereas quality in the latter case is a 
continuous random variable whose distribution is altered by the process followed. The 
interpretation of the continuous case is straightforward. Let Mq  be the minimum accept-
able quality to be considered good quality (or with desirable properties for good 
performance at the processing stage, or to deliver a good eating experience). In this case, 
Mq  divides the range of the random variable Q  into two subsets defined in 1ℜ , namely, 
{ }:L Mq q q q= ∈ ≤_  and { }:H Mq q q q= ∈ ≥_ . Hence, ( ) ( )M LQF q P Q q= ∈  would be 
the unconditional probability that the product is inferior or unacceptable. A product that 
is deemed inferior receives a lower price than that certified as being high quality. This 
interpretation is akin to attributes such as the tenderness of a steak, where Mq  would be 
some acceptable degree of tenderness, or to food safety, where Mq  would be interpreted 
as the count of pathogens5 that makes a particular food item unsafe.6 
The discrete case can be analyzed in a similar way. Strictly speaking, here the input 
has or fails to have a particular attribute or was or was not produced following a value-
adding (cost-increasing) production process. For example, milk used by some companies 
was produced with or without treating milking cows with genetically engineered hor-
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mones such as rBST (recombinant bovine somatotropin). Also, eggs can be produced us-
ing animal welfare7 enhancing techniques (e.g., free-range production) or by 
conventional means. Poultry is or is not fed with animal protein. Crops can be grown 
conventionally or using environmentally friendly practices (e.g., minimum tillage).  
However, to unify the analysis, we will differentiate by class of production prac-
tice. For example, in the case of animal welfare, we will consider a product to be of 
high quality if the production facilities meet a minimum set of amenities or if certain 
practices, such as forced molting of egg-laying hens, are avoided. Another example 
would be the intensity of the soil conservation practices employed. A different interpre-
tation of Q  is needed to tackle this type of attribute. Let _  be the set of all production 
practices “bought” by the input-processing firm. The natural variability here would 
come from the heterogeneity of farmers. Implicit here is the idea that the firms will buy 
from producers and certify the product if they believe the input was produced following 
a process that meets or surpasses some minimum standard (more on this to follow). 
Hence, _  would represent the set of all input procured from producers who have the 
capabilities needed to produce, and are believed to produce, following the desired proc-
esses. The clarification is important because having the capabilities does not necessarily 
mean that the process will be strictly followed under conditions of imperfect informa-
tion.8 A problem of moral hazard arises here. Because production of the high-quality 
input is costlier than production for a commodity market, and there is a strictly positive 
probability that deviant behavior will not be discovered and penalized, suppliers will 
find it rational to deviate from perfect compliance.9,10 Hence, there is a strictly positive 
fraction of the output that will not be produced under the desired cost-increasing condi-
tions. This fraction is again represented by FQ (qM). 
The preceding discussion suggests that there are two different types of uncertainties 
associated with the attribute under consideration. In the discrete case, the uncertainty is 
mainly about the opportunism of the suppliers, whereas the continuous case also entails 
the uncertainty derived from the randomness associated with agricultural processes that 
generate a distribution of qualities for any given set of production practices.  
In terms of quality, the choice of the firm is on the QAS and the associated strin-
gency of controls. Suppose there is a set of alternative systems denoted by 
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{ }: 0 US s s s= ∈ℜ ≤ ≤ , where 0s =  represents the absence of quality verification (reli-
ance on claims made by suppliers), and Us s=  is a situation in which the quality of the 
product is perfectly revealed (e.g., perfect monitoring, vertical integration, or a good sys-
tem of incentives). In the absence of a QAS, the processor rationally expects to obtain an 
input of “average” quality from the market for raw materials. When Us s=  is chosen, 
note that the actual quality of a given unit of input will be perfectly revealed only on the 
discrete case; in the continuous case, even the most stringent system available still leaves 
the uncertainty derived from the randomness of the production environment and attribut-
able to scientific ignorance over biological processes. However, in the continuous case, a 
more stringent system potentially has the double effect of increasing the proportion of 
compliers and the probability of being in the set Hq . 
In short, a processor procuring raw materials from certified suppliers (using the QAS 
indexed by s) expects to buy a fraction of good-quality input, denoted by 
( ) ( )1 Ms F q sλ = − . Also, a fraction ( ) ( )1 MQs F q s− λ =  of the inferior input is ex-
pected because of the informational imperfections noted earlier. Here, we consider the 
QAS as aiding in the selection of which input to buy. All inputs bought (and hence certi-
fied) will be subjected to the production activity and sold to downstream customers as 
possessing the desired trait.11 The case where 0s =  (absent an assurance effort) will re-
sult in the processor buying an input that is expected to have average market quality. To 
put it concisely, ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1M MF q F qλ = − = − . Alternatively, if the input were going 
to be bought anyway, the QAS would be functioning as a sorting device that allocates the 
input either to the commodity or to the high-quality market (or production process). In 
this case, the QAS tells the processor how much a unit of the input is worth to him, just 
as an imperfect test does (Hennessy 1996). 
With this in place, we can focus on how to model the effects of a more stringent 
QAS on the overall quality of the product traded by the processor. For this purpose, we 
will use the concept of first-order stochastic dominance. Implementation of different lev-
els of stringency switches the relevant distributions for quality as follows. For any 
,i js s S∈  there is an associated conditional distribution for quality, namely, ( )iQF q s  
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and ( )jQF q s . In this context, increasing the level of stringency of the QAS, for example, 
by moving from is  to js  where i js s≤ , leads to a first-order stochastically dominating 
shift on the distribution of quality. Therefore, we have that ( ) ( )i jQ QF q s F q s≥  for all 
q Q∈ . In particular, this implies that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1j M j M i is F q s F q s sλ = − ≥ − = λ . This 
can be interpreted as reducing the probability of incurring type I (rejecting an input that is 
of good quality12) and type II (certifying a product that is of low quality) errors. In short, 
systems that are more stringent increase the precision with which the actual quality of the 
input is asserted by processors. If we are willing to assume that ( )QF q s  is differentiable 
with respect to s, the previous implies that ( ) 0s s∂λ ∂ ≥ . 
However, the implementation of a QAS does not come without a cost. As noted be-
fore, the use of cost-increasing technologies has to be compensated for by processors. 
Complications arise, however, because the incentives of farmers and processors are not 
aligned, and the production practices used at the farm level are only imperfectly ob-
served. Hence, processors may have to give up some information rent if they want to 
elicit production of high-quality inputs (or in the language of agency theory, a high level 
of effort from the principal’s suppliers or agents). In other words, there are costs for 
monitoring and/or providing the incentives (e.g., premiums or discounts) to discourage 
dishonest performance on the part of input suppliers. We seek to capture those costs13 
through a cost function ( ),C s y , which satisfies ( ), 0C y s s∂ ∂ > , where y  is the per pe-
riod output rate.  
The exposition from here on will be made in terms of processors and consumers. 
However, we could replace consumers by downstream firms to study issues within a sup-
ply chain. Consumers value both types of goods but value the high-quality good more 
and are willing to pay a premium for it. Because consumers can only assert the quality of 
a given product imperfectly, they must rely on the signals sent by the processors, in the 
form of quality certification.14 Hence, we assume that consumers are willing to pay a 
price premium for a good that comes from a quality-assured process.  
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Putting all this together, the processor chooses the output rate, whether to participate 
in the market for quality-certified goods, and what level of certainty to obtain from the 
QAS or to direct its product toward the market for commodities. Clearly, the processor 
will implement a QAS as long as the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so.  
Participation in the market for high-quality goods, using the QAS indexed by s , 
yields a per period profit of ( ) ( ) ( ), ; ; ,r y s a R y a C y sπ = − , where the revenue function 
( );R y a  potentially depends on the firm’s rate of output y  and the strength of consumer 
preference for high-quality goods a . The superscript in the profit function represents the 
state of the world, where the processor has a reputation. 
We could append a term to the profit function, representing the economic loss due to 
certifying a product that is of low quality. Several potential interpretations are possible 
for this loss. It could be the result of obtaining a bad reputation through some form of in-
formation dissemination or could occur just because the consumer will make future 
purchases from other processors. It also could be the result of legal action under the cur-
rent tort law, applying mainly in the case of a food safety interpretation of the model. 
However, Caswell and Henson (1997) argue that this last effect is likely to be less impor-
tant than the loss of reputation or market share. Therefore, the latter is the interpretation 
to which we adhere in this paper. The punishment for a processor that delivers a good of 
noticeable substandard quality is that it will lose consumers’ trust and hence will be un-
able to sell its output in the market for value-added products in future periods. Note, 
however, that the processor obtains the price for the certified commodity no matter what 
the actual quality might be, because customers cannot assert a priori whether the claims 
made by the processor are false. In other words, processors will be trusted until proven 
wrong. Consumers’ trust is what defines the states of the world in this model. For a given 
processor, demand is state contingent, where the states of the world reflect whether it is 
trusted by consumers or not. For this sort of punishment mechanism to have an impact on 
a firm’s decisions, modeling more than one period is required (Klein and Leffler 1981). 
Selling product into the market for commodities or non-differentiated products yields 
a quasi-rent of 0π =  independent of processors’ reputations, since the market for the 
commodity is assumed perfectly competitive.  
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Optimal Choice of Quality Assurance Systems 
We are now in a position to examine how fundamental characteristics of the eco-
nomic environment influence decisions about the implementation of a QAS and the 
relative profitability of the competing markets or options, paying special attention to the 
discoverability of the sought-after quality attribute and the form of the punishment. 
Clearly, QASs will be observed if ( )( ), 0rE s y∏ ≥ π =  for some s S∈ , and 0y > . That 
is, if there is a combination of output rate and QAS that makes the expected return of the 
value-added market to be positive, then the firm has an incentive to enter the value-added 
market. Throughout the analysis, we assume for mathematical convenience that there is a 
continuum of stringency levels from which to choose. 
We introduce ω  to parameterize the degree to which consumers can ascertain the ac-
tual quality of the good. It measures the ease with which quality is observed after 
consumption. For example, we could interpret [0,1]ω∈  as the exogenous probability that 
a consumer discovers the true quality of the product. 1ω =  implies that quality is per-
fectly observable after consumption, or the sought-after characteristic is an experience 
attribute. Credence attributes are represented by 0ω = .  
Recall that we assume processors will be trusted until proven wrong. Therefore, 
there are only two possible states of the world denoted by 1,2r = . The first state denotes 
the periods where the processor has a good reputation, and hence faces a positive de-
mand. In state two, the demand for the high quality product is zero. Since profits are zero 
in the second state of the world, the superscript of the per period profit function will be 
dropped here.  
Let T  denote the point in time where the processor loses its reputation (moves from 
the first to the second state). That is, T  is the period in which consumers purchase a 
product that does not meet the standards promised and find out that this is the case. A 
processor that moves from state 1 to state 2 in period T  has profits given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
1 1
1, , ; , ; , ;
1
TT T
t t
t t
s y y s a y s a y s a ββ π π β π β
− −
= =
−∏ = = = −∑ ∑ . (1) 
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As before, ( )π i  represents the per period profits of a processor that has a good repu-
tation. Since it depends only on the state of the world, we can pull per period profits out 
of the summation. In equation (1), β  is the relevant discount factor, a  again denotes the 
size of the market for value-added products, and y  and s  represent the levels of output 
and QAS, respectively.15 We assume that 0a
π∂ ≥∂ , i.e., per period profits increase as 
the demand for high-quality products strengthens. Again, profits are zero once the seller 
is forced out of the value-added market. 
However, quality is random and the processor cannot exert perfect control over it. A 
processor can only affect the distribution of quality in the sense described earlier. Hence, 
it is not known when a processor will lose its reputation. The processor’s expected profits 
are therefore 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 ,1, , ; , , ;
1 1
TT E m s
E y s E y s a m s y s a
β ωβπ ω πβ β
− −∏ = = − −  , 
where ( ),m s ω  denotes the probability that a processor with a QAS s  in place will stay 
in the value-added market for a trait with discoverability ω . In particular, note that the 
probability of staying in the market or keeping a consumer’s goodwill for two successive 
periods, ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), 1 1m s s sω λ λ ω= + − − , combines the probability that resulting qual-
ity is high with the probability of type II error weighted by the consumer’s level of 
awareness.16 A processor will face a zero demand in the second period with probability 
( )1 ,m s ω− . 
To make further progress, we need an expression for ( )( ),TE m sβ ω . Note that T is 
just counting the number of periods until the first notorious (discovered) failure. Since the 
outcome in a given period is independent of the outcome of other periods, T is the num-
ber of Bernoulli trials required to get the first failure. This is just the description of a 
geometric random variable with “success” probability ( )1 ,m s ω− . The previous observa-
tion allows us to obtain the required expression as     
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )11 1
1 ,
, Pr , 1 ,
1 ,
tT t t
t t
m s
E m s T t m s m s
m s
ω ββ ω β β ω ω β ω
∞ ∞ −
= =
−= = = − = −∑ ∑ . 
Substituting this back, we see that the processor expected profits are 
( )( ) ( )( )
, ;
,
1 ,
y s a
E y s
m s
π
β ω∏ = − . 
Suppose first that the choice of the output rate is independent of the optimal QAS. 
This may be the case where output and safety are nonjoint in inputs (see Chambers, 
1989), or when investments in QAS do not depend on the rate of output. The choice of 
output in this case is the standard monopolist profit maximization problem. To focus on 
the selection of stringency of controls, we assume that processors only procure and sell 
one unit of the good (or the optimal and independently chosen *y , which is fixed here). 
The problem then reduces to the choice of investments in QAS that maximizes profits as 
follows: 
( )( ) ( )( )
1, ;
max 1, max
1 ,s S s S
s a
E s
m s
π
β ω∈ ∈∏ = − . 
A quick look at this problem reveals that the easier it is for a processor to acquire in-
formation about quality (i.e., the cheaper it is to implement a QAS that yields a given 
level of certainty about quality), the more likely it is that a QAS will be implemented. A 
rising price premium also would increase the likelihood that there exists a profitable 
QAS. The first-order condition with respect to s  is 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1, 1, ; ,1 , 1, ; 0E s s a m sm s s as s sπ ωβ ω π β
∂ ∏ ∂ ∂= − + ≤∂ ∂ ∂  (2) 
with equality if * 0s > . Note that ( ) ( )1, ; 1,s a C s
s s
π∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ . The second-order sufficient 
condition (S.O.S.C. presented in the appendix) is assumed to hold. 
Equation (2) has the usual interpretation. It states that the level of stringency should 
be increased until the marginal benefits of increased stringency equal the marginal costs. 
Marginal benefits of an increase in s equals the change in the proportion of purchases that 
are of high quality multiplied by the probability that low-quality output will be discov-
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ered,17 the per period profit rate, and a factor that takes into account the multi-period na-
ture of the problem at hand. The marginal benefits of increased assurance rise as the 
quality of the good is more readily observable by the processor’s customers, and as the 
potential punishments for false certification become more severe. Switching to the second 
state of the world is a harsher punishment when per period profits are high and the future 
is important to the processor. The marginal cost of an increase in s is simply the increase 
in costs that must be incurred to implement a more stringent QAS. 
In this problem it is straightforward to show that the optimal level of investments in 
quality assurance is unambiguously increasing in the size of the market (or strength of the 
demand for value-added products) and the value processors place in the future. These 
comparative statics can be represented by  
( ) ( )
*
1, ; ,
0
. . . .
s a m s
a ss
a S O S C
π ωβ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂  = − >∂  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* 1, ; ,, 1, ;
0
. . . .
s a m s
m s s a
s ss
S O S C
π ωω π
β
 ∂ ∂− + ∂ ∂∂  = − >∂ . 
We next show that the ability of consumers to perceive quality also increases the op-
timal level of stringency of the QAS. This can be seen by implicit differentiation of 
equation (2) (assuming an interior solution and dropping the arguments of the functions 
to reduce notational clutter):  
 ( )2 2 22 2 *1 0m s m mms s s s
π πβ πβ πβ βω ω ω
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− + + − ≡ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
.  
The term in square brackets denotes the usual second-order conditions of the maxi-
mization problem, and hence is negative. Therefore, 
( ) 2*sgn sgn m ms s sππβ βω ω ω ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  . Note that 
2m
s ω
∂
∂ ∂  and 
m
s
πβ ω
∂ ∂
∂ ∂  are both posi-
tive and therefore we cannot determine this sign directly. To show that this difference is 
positive, add equation (2) to it (which is the first-order condition of the problem and 
hence zero), and multiply by ( )
1
1
m
m
β ω β
∂
∂ −  to obtain 
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2* 1sgn sgn
1
s m m m m
s s s s m
π ππβ β β πβω ω ω ω β
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  = − + +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −    
, 
which simplifies to 
 ( ) ( )
*sgn sgn 1 0
1
s
m s
πβ λ βω β
 ∂ ∂  = − ≥    ∂ − ∂   
. 
Thus, as consumers become more able to discern quality, processors find it optimal 
to increase their expenditures in reputation-preserving devices such as QASs. This re-
veals that as the economic loss from incurring a type II error and/or being discovered 
increases, processors will be more careful about the product they certify. 
A more interesting and perhaps more realistic situation arises when the choice of the 
level of output is not independent of the investments in quality. Antle (2001) classifies 
quality control technologies for producing quality-differentiated goods as process control, 
inspection, testing, and identity preservation. He argues that all these technologies except 
testing affect the variable costs of production. However, the costs of the testing technolo-
gies are not independent of the rate of output, since sampling of a small proportion of the 
product is typically involved. Weaver and Kim (2002) also model quantity and quality as 
competing goals.18 
In this case, we can write the processor’s problem, which is to choose the optimal 
QAS and output level to maximize expected profits, as follows: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )0, 0,
, ;
max , max
1 ,y s S y s S
y s a
E y s
m s
π
β ω≥ ∈ ≥ ∈∏ = − . 
Straightforward applications of the envelope theorem confirm the intuitive result that 
processors are better off when they face a larger demand in state 1 (higher a ), when they 
are more “patient” (higher β ), and when it is harder for consumers to determine true 
output quality (lower ω ). In particular, the envelope theorem immediately indicates that 
( )( )
( )( )
, 1 0
1 ,
E y s
a a m s
π
β ω
∂ ∏ ∂= ≥∂ ∂ − , 
( )( ) ( )
( )( )2
, ,
0
1 ,
E y s m s
m s
ωπβ β ω
∂ ∏ = ≥∂ −
, 
and 
( )( ) ( )
( )( )2
, , 1 0
1 ,
E y s m s
m s
ωπβω ω β ω
∂ ∏ ∂= ≤∂ ∂ − . A direct implication of the last de-
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rivative is that as long as the certification system is imperfect, ( ) ( )( )1 1Ms F q sλ = − < , 
the profitability of participation in the market for quality-assured products is hindered by 
increased consumer awareness.  
The first-order conditions for this problem are given by 
 ( ) ( ), ; 0 0E y s a y
y y
π∂ ∏ ∂= ≤ ≥∂ ∂  (3a) 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
1
1
,
, ;
, ; 0 0
1 ,
m s
E y s a sy s a s
s s m s
ωβπ π β ω
∂
∂ ∏ ∂ ∂= + ≤ ≥∂ ∂ −  (3b) 
and the corresponding complementary slackness conditions. 
These first-order conditions can in principle be solved to obtain the optimal choices 
for output and stringency of controls represented by ( )* , ,y aω β  and ( )* , ,s aω β , re-
spectively. 
Second-order conditions (presented in the appendix) are assumed to hold. It is natu-
ral to ask what the optimal responses are in terms of output and choice of QAS as the 
parameters change. That is, what are the signs of *y ω∂ ∂ , *s ω∂ ∂ , *y β∂ ∂ , *s β∂ ∂ , 
*y
a
∂ ∂ , and *s a∂ ∂ ? Some of these signs can be found by conducting comparative statics 
in the proposed model. However, the structure of the problem makes the signs of the last 
two derivatives inherently ambiguous.19 The intuition is that as a  increases, there is an 
incentive to increase the rate of output, which may in turn partially offset the gain in 
price. Increasing the output rate potentially has the double effect of reducing per unit 
price and increasing production costs (in a case of decreasing returns-to-scale technolo-
gies). Also, increases in the profitability of the market for value-added products provide 
incentives to monitor more closely product quality and to delay the transition to the sec-
ond state. However, this has to be weighted against the costs incurred in doing so.20  
We now tackle the question of the optimal choices of output and QAS as quality be-
comes more readily discernible. Differentiating system (3) partially with respect to ω  
using the chain rule, we get (after some rearrangement) 
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( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
, ;
, ; *
, *, ; , ;
, ;
1 ,
y s a
y s a yy s
y
m s sy s a y s a sy s ay s s m s
ππ
ωωπ βπ π ωβ ω
 ∂∂  ∂ ∂ ∂  ∂ ∂  = ∂ ∂ ∂  ∂  ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − 
 
 ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )22
0
, ; , , ,
1 ,
1 ,
y s a m s m s m s
m s
s sm s
π β ω ω ωβ ω βω ωβ ω
   ∂ ∂ ∂− − +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −   
 (4)  
Recalling that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), 1 1m s s sω λ λ ω= + − −  and applying the same technique 
used in the previous problem, the second element of the vector on the right-hand side of 
the system (4) can be written again as ( )( )
( ) ( )2 1
1 ,
s
sm s
λπβ ββ ω
∂− −∂− , which makes 
its negative sign clear. Samuelson’s (1947) conjugate pairs theorem immediately asserts 
* 0sω
∂ >∂ . As consumers become more able to discern quality, processors will find it op-
timal to adopt more stringent controls. This result is similar in a sense to one of the 
findings of Darby and Karni (1973). These authors argued that it is very likely (albeit not 
necessarily true) that as consumers become more knowledgeable, the optimal amount of 
fraud is reduced.21 In our paper, firms would have incentives to reduce the number of 
mistakes they make as consumers become increasingly able to discern qualities (or be-
come more informed).  
There exists a key trade-off between the benefits and costs of information acquisition 
on the part of processors. Having a more precise QAS, though costly, decreases the prob-
ability that firms will lose consumers trust. Furthermore, as the expected losses derived 
from consumer distrust increase, the payoff from the processor becoming better informed 
about actual quality increases. 
Using Cramer’s rule to solve for *yω
∂
∂ , we find that the sign is ambiguous without 
imposing further structure, since ω  enters by itself in the second equation of system (3). 
Reputation, Quality Observability, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems / 17 
 
Moreover, system (4) tells us that ( ) ( )2*sgn sgny y sπω∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂ , which is not implied by 
the maximization hypothesis alone. Since it is reasonable to assume that raising the levels 
of controls increases the marginal costs of production, and noting that 
2 2C
y s y s
π∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ , we 
expect the optimal output rate to decrease as ω  increases.  
The question of how the value that producers place on the future affects the optimal 
choices of QAS and output levels can be explored through a similar exercise. The deriva-
tions are as follows: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
, ;
, ; *
, *, ; , ;
, ;
1 ,
y s a
y s a y
y s
y
m s sy s a y s a sy s ay s s m s
ππ
βωπ βπ π ββ ω
 ∂∂ ∂  ∂ ∂   ∂ ∂   =∂ ∂  ∂ ∂ ∂   + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − 
 
 ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
0
, ,1 , ;
1 , 1 ,
m s m s
y s a
s m s m s
ω β ω πβ ω β ω
   ∂ − +    ∂ − −  
. 
Solving the system by Cramer’s rule, we obtain 
 
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2
, , , ;1 , ;
1 , 1 ,*
, , , ;1 , ;
1 , 1 ,* .
m s m s y s a
y s a
s y sm s m sy
H
m s m s y s a
y s a
s ym s m ss
H
  ∂ ∂ +  ∂ ∂ ∂− − ∂   =∂
  ∂ ∂ +  ∂ ∂− − ∂   = −∂
ω β ω ππβ ω β ω
β
ω β ω ππβ ω β ω
β
 
Thus, we know that 
 
( )2 , ;*sgn sgn
* 0.
y s ay
y s
s
 ∂ ∂ =   ∂ ∂ ∂   
∂ ≥∂
π
β
β
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As the future becomes more important, it is more valuable for processors to invest in 
QASs that give them a longer expected presence in the market. The sign of *yβ
∂
∂  is am-
biguous as before (and because of the exact same reasons). However, the previous 
discussion suggests it is negative. Increasing the expenses incurred to “learn” about the 
actual quality of the good increases variable costs of production, and hence it is optimal 
to cut back on the output rate. 
Our findings are intuitively appealing and consistent with what we observe in reality. 
An earlier paper, Carriquiry, Babcock, and Carbone 2003, provides case studies of sev-
eral QASs in use. Through a side-by-side comparison of the different QASs, we 
concluded that the cost and associated reliability of a system seem to be correlated with 
the expected economic damage that would result from false certification. Of the cases 
studied, the least stringent system was implemented for a trait with low discoverability 
such as rBST-free milk. There is no test capable of distinguishing rBST-free milk from 
milk obtained from rBST-treated cows. The most stringent (of the studied) QASs, im-
plemented by Niman Ranch, is associated with the experience attribute of superior eating 
quality. 
 
Conclusions 
A repeated-purchases model is developed to explore the fundamental economic factors 
that lie behind the choice of different QASs and their associated degrees of stringency by 
firms. Differences in the quality discoverability of a sought-after attribute, attractiveness of 
a market, and the value placed in the future are among the factors contributing to the im-
plementation of widely diverse systems across participants in different markets. Close 
attention is paid to the role of reputations in providing the incentives for firms to deliver 
high-quality goods in an environment of symmetrically imperfect information.  
To summarize, we have modeled the decision of a monopolistic processor that 
chooses its per period output rate and the stringency of the QAS to implement in a poten-
tially infinitely lived market. The duration of the market is unknown to the processor. 
However, it can influence the duration (stochastically) through its choices. In this setting, 
processors or firms implementing more stringent QASs are expected to keep their reputa-
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tion for a larger number of time periods. Our main findings are that (a) the stringency of 
the QAS will be higher for more easily discoverable traits, more patient firms, and more 
attractive markets (only when the output rate is fixed); (b) firms are more likely to im-
plement a QAS when the future is important, the quality trait is harder to observe, and, of 
course, when the demand for the differentiated product is stronger; and (c) the effect of 
both the discoverability of the quality trait and the value firms place on the future on the 
per period output rate is in general ambiguous, but we argue that an inverse relationship 
between both variables and the output rate is more likely.
  
Endnotes 
1. For example, Dimitri and Greene (2002) reported that the retail industry for organic 
food has grown at a rate of 20 percent per year since 1990.  
2. That is, they fall into what Nelson (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973) labeled as ex-
perience and credence attributes. The former refers to attributes that can be observed 
after consumption (for example, toughness of a steak), whereas for the latter, con-
sumption does not provide information about the quality of the product (e.g., free-
range eggs, dolphin-safe tuna, organic beef). Many food attributes can be thus classi-
fied (see, e.g., Caswell and Mojduszka 1996; Antle 1996; and Unnevehr and Jensen 
1996). 
3. Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker (1998) provide an overview of the functions and ef-
fects of QMSs (or metasystems as they call them) on the food industry. See also 
Henson and Hooker 2001. 
4. The quantity of Q is assumed to increase with the quality of the underlying input. 
5. For this interpretation, we would need to reverse the claim that a larger Q represents 
a higher quality. Pathogen counts above Mq represent an unacceptable good. 
6. Antle (2001) provides a literature review of the economics of food safety. Segerson 
(1999) discusses whether reliance on voluntary approaches to food safety will pro-
vide adequate levels of safety in a competitive framework that allows for consumers 
and firms to be imperfectly informed about potential damages. Marette, Bureau, and 
Gozlan (2000) explore the provision of product safety and possible public regulation 
for search, experience, and credence attributes when the supply sector competes im-
perfectly and hence can use prices as signals. However, in their model, and in 
Daughety and Reinganum 1995, sellers know the actual quality of the product they 
offer in each period. 
7. See Blandford et al. 2002 for a classification of science-based definitions and meas-
ures of animal welfare. 
8. Hayes and Lence (2002) provide the example of Parma Ham. They discuss that only 
ham produced within a certain region can be marketed as Parma Ham. The rationale 
for the restriction is that the weather in this region during the dry-curing process is 
what gives the ham its unique attributes. Nowadays, however, the dry-curing process 
is mainly carried on in modern, climate-controlled facilities. 
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9. There is ample literature that shows that when certification is imperfect, some pro-
ducers of low quality will apply and obtain certification. See De and Nabar 1991; 
and Mason and Sterbenz 1994. 
10. Hennessy (1996) and Chalfant et al. (1999) showed that imperfect testing and grad-
ing lead to under-investment in quality-enhancing techniques by farmers. This is 
because producers of low quality impose an externality on producers of high quality. 
11. Firms would be participating in only one market. 
12. Type I errors may be due to imperfections on the QAS (for example, because of in-
correct monitoring). This would increase the costs of procuring the input the 
processor needs. 
13. Note that we are being vague about what is being represented by this cost function. It 
could be modeling search costs, monitoring costs, or compensation given to farmers 
to induce high levels of effort. 
14. This does not mean that their message to customers has to coincide with the assur-
ance they get from the suppliers. For example, a restaurant that sources beef that is 
assured to be from a certain breed (e.g., Angus) may want to claim that the steaks 
they serve are tender. Another example would be a branded product. A customer of a 
well-known upscale restaurant expects to get a tender steak, and the restaurant will 
try to buy only beef it can certify to have been fed in a certain way or, again, from a 
certain breed. 
15. The rightmost equality follows by recognizing that the summation term is a partial sum 
of a geometric series.  
16. Note that ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1 1m s s s sω λ λ ω ω ωλ= + − − = − +  is the convex combi-
nation between the true probability of having a product of high quality and 1. We see 
again that as 0ω → , ( ), 1m s ω → , and the processors are expected to stay in state 
one for a large number of periods, even if they are offering a product that does not 
meet the promised standards.  
17. Note that ( ) ( ),m s s
s s
ω λω∂ ∂=∂ ∂ . 
18. They model quality as a product diversion process. 
19. Note that the parameter a  enters by itself in both equations of system (3). See 
Silberberg 1990. 
20. For the commonly studied case of linear demand and constant marginal cost, both 
*y
a
∂
∂  and 
*s
a
∂
∂  are positive. 
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21. Note that in Darby and Karni’s (1973) paper, supplying firms knew the actual quality 
of the product (repair services) they were offering. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 
Second-Order Sufficient Conditions 
 
Second-order sufficient conditions for the optimal choice of QAS for fixed *y  are 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
2
2 2 2
2 2
,
1, 1, ;
1, ; 0
1 ,
m s
E s s a ss a
s s m s
ωβπ π β ω
∂
∂ ∏ ∂ ∂= + ≤∂ ∂ −   
The Hessian for second-order sufficient conditions for the optimal QAS when both 
y  and s  are choice variables is 
 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
, ;
, ;
,
, ; , ;
, ;
1 ,
y s a
y s a
y s
y
H m s
y s a y s a sy s ay s s m s
ππ
ωπ βπ π β ω
 ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ ∂ − 
, 
which implies that the second-order sufficient conditions will be satisfied when the fol-
lowing hold: 
1. 
( )2
2
, ;
0
y s a
y
π∂ ≤∂ ; 
2. ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
2
22 2 22
2 2
,
, ; , ; , ;
, ; 0
1 ,
m s
y s a y s a y s asH y s a
y s y sm s
ωβπ π ππ β ω
 ∂   ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = + − ≥  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂−     
; 
and 
3. ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
2
2 2
2
,
, ;
, ; 0
1 ,
m s
y s a sy s a
s m s
ωβπ π β ω
 ∂ ∂ ∂ + ≤∂ −   
, (implied by [1] and [2] together).
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